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
13 March 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
2. USSR: British and West German ambassadors in Moscow feel Khrushchev plans no new initiatives on major East-West issues for the time being. (Page 2)
3. Iraq-USSR: Iraqi military wants Soviet-sponsored SAM project terminated and missiles and technicians returned to USSR. (Page 4)



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USSR: (There is further recent evidence that the Soviet Union does not intend to take any new initiatives on the major East-West issues for the time being.)

(The new British and West German ambassadors, after their first conversations with Khrushchev, each observed that Khrushchev seemed unable to see his course clearly through many difficulties.)

(In his talks with the ambassadors, Khrushchev restated the Soviet position on Berlin and Germany in general terms but did not mention Soviet proposals for a UN presence in West Berlin.)

(He indicated to UK Ambassador Trevelyan that he felt the US no longer had any genuine interest in reducing international tensions and had only entered into bilateral talks on Berlin, as in some "kind of game," for internal political reasons.)

(On the nuclear test-ban issue, Khrushchev maintained that Moscow's offer of two or three on-site inspections a year was not negotiable.)

(The Soviet leader told Trevelyan that the USSR already had set up one nuclear rocket weapons system but was proceeding with a new system which was very costly. This reflects the line he took in his 27 February speech, in which he stated military expenditures would continue to be a heavy burden for the USSR.)

(Regarding Cuba, Khrushchev insisted that he, and not President Kennedy, had made the concessions.)

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(during the crisis. He protested that US statements declaring that President Kennedy had not undertaken any commitments not to invade Cuba were "very dangerous and could have fatal consequences." From Khrushchev's references to "criticisms" of his actions in the Cuban affair, Trevelyan surmised that the Soviet leader was "nervous about finding himself on the spot, between Washington on one side and Peiping on the other.")

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\*Iraq-USSR: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] are urging that the Soviet-sponsored surface-to-air missile project be terminated and that both missiles and technicians be sent back to the USSR.)

(A recommendation to this effect is to be sent to the defense minister soon. [REDACTED] the project essentially involves Soviet interests and that Iraq has no need for the missiles. They feel the cost is excessive in terms of money and technical personnel.)

(Relations between Iraqi and Soviet technicians at the missile installation have deteriorated markedly since the 8 February coup. The Soviets are reportedly refusing to reveal technical details to the Iraqis.)

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Jordan: (The Jordanian Government is reconsidering its policies toward neighboring Arab states since the recent coups in Syria and Iraq.)

(Despite public statements by officials in the two revolutionary governments clearly marking Jordan and Saudi Arabia as countries still to be liberated from "reactionary" rule, Jordan thus far has adopted a restrained public attitude toward them. It promptly recognized both new regimes.)

(Privately, however, both King Husayn and Prime Minister Tal are depressed and disturbed. They told Ambassador Macomber on 10 March that they were ready to respond in kind "if any further public slurs are cast on Jordan." The King went so far as to say that if anyone tried to provoke trouble within Jordan, his regime would react forcibly against the external source of the trouble after suppressing the local uprising.)

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Yemen-Aden: (British officials have indicated that they intend to pursue a tough line on any further intrusions into Aden Protectorate territory by Egyptian or Yemeni republican forces.)

(Pilots of the British Hawker Hunters patrolling the border have instructions to attack Egyptian or Yemeni aircraft over the protectorate but not to undertake "hot pursuit." Some officials in Aden are pressing the British Government to go further and sanction retaliatory raids across the border in the event of air attacks from Yemen.)

(In addition, British authorities apparently are reluctant to take steps to prevent the Sharif of Bayhan from establishing a haven for royalists driven from southeastern Yemen by Egyptian and Yemeni units. As the flow of refugees grows, the Egyptian and Yemeni commands will be tempted to strike into the undefined border area, and perhaps deep into Bayhan, to crush the royalists and prevent their being rearmed and sent back into Yemen.)

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
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Israel - Arab States: Recent developments in the Arab states will tend to raise the temperature along the Arab-Israeli borders.

Although there is no evidence that the firing by Syrian border guards on Israeli field workers on 11 March indicates the adoption of a tougher policy toward Israel by the new Syrian regime, the Israelis may nevertheless be more prone to react sharply to any threat to their borders at this time. Arab statements regarding a Syrian-Iraqi-UAR union, and particularly Iraqi proposals for a unified military command, undoubtedly have increased Israel's concern for its long-range security.

Israeli leaders are also extremely sensitive about Jordan, and have frequently made clear that the overthrow of King Husayn's regime would provoke Israeli intervention.



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France: (The 13-day-old coal miners' strike threatens to provoke a political test of strength which could jeopardize effective implementation of De Gaulle's national programs.)

(Union leaders now reportedly estimate that funds are available to extend the strike for one or two months and that further financial aid may be in prospect. Although national labor leaders and unions in other sectors of the nationalized industries have been reserved in their support, the miners' stand encourages other workers to pursue their own grievances, and may induce them to call parallel strikes. A two-day warning strike by workers in the natural gas fields has been extended into an unlimited one and railroad workers are holding a series of two-hour work stoppages.)

(The government is reluctant to enforce its conscription orders in view of the solidarity of the miners and the public support for their position from political parties, church officials, and businessmen. Union leaders reportedly believe that even a personal appeal by De Gaulle would now be insufficient to break the strike without further concessions. These would not only elicit similar demands from other labor elements, but would also complicate the government's effort to hold the line against inflation.)

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Argentina: Some elements of the armed forces are dissatisfied with the government for recognizing the Popular Union Party, which will substitute for the outlawed Peronist party in contesting the national elections set for next June. Military leaders, however, have indicated they will not permit their subordinates to upset the government's plans. Government officials, meanwhile, have launched a press and radio campaign to explain the need to reincorporate the Peronist movement into the political life of the country, and to give assurances that there will be no Peronist take-over as a consequence.

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\*Guatemala: Students are planning a series of antigovernment demonstrations in Guatemala City, beginning 13 March, in commemoration of riots a year ago in which several students were killed by security forces.

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